In recent months, Tibetan-Chinese relations have been strained, to say the least. Indeed, anyone who has seen a “Free Tibet” headband is aware of the multitude of problems that exist between China and the aforementioned state. The recent protests in Lhasa — which quickly devolved to violence — attest to the pressing nature of the conflict.
Perhaps the most troubling aspect, though, is China’s stance on the issue. The People’s Republic seems content with simply staving off any conflict until the Dalai Lama dies, their thought process being that without strong leadership, Tibetan resistance will fragment and lose momentum.
This is fundamentally problematic for a few reasons. First, contrary to beliefs held by Chinese officials, tensions will by no means disappear upon the Dalai Lama’s death.
While it is true that the Tibetan leader should have condemned violence in Lhasa in a much more timely fashion, he has certainly been a stabilizing force in the region.
Without his peacekeeping efforts, conditions in Tibet would only escalate; every day, his very existence saves the lives of hundreds of angry Tibetans.
Without the Dalai Lama, Tibet would likely resemble a region in which ethnic conflict has been much more disastrous: Xinjiang.
There, human rights abuses happen more frequently than in Tibet, but without the Dalai Lama to draw international attention and garner sympathy from the global community, many of them have gone unnoticed.
Additionally, conflicts between the indigenous people of Xinjiang and Han Chinese have been arguably worse than those occurring in Tibet.
Prospects for Tibet, then, look increasingly grim. The combination of consistent marginalization and military prressure from the PRC will almost certianly push the revolutionary Tibetan — and even those with moderate political views — into a corner.
Without the guidance and mediating effect of the Dalai Lama, these revolutionary feelings can very easily translate into violence and warfare.
Another reason that China’s policy with regard to Tibet is flawed involves the nature of conflict resolution. In order for any substantial — and especially ethnic — inter- or intrastate problem to be resolved, concessions must be made on both sides.
Look, for example, to the Good Friday Agreement; only through large concessions were Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland able to reach a lasting peace.
If there is any hope for peace between Tibet and China proper, both sides must be willing to concede some ground.
The problem with letting the Dalai Lama die, then, is that there will be no one to force Tibet to concede.
As previously stated, revolutionaries in Tibet will only radicalize upon their leader’s death.
Given an incensed populace, lack of effective leadership and a China that will undoubtedly take a hard-line stance, the probability of any concessions trends to zero.
So what can be done? For the Dalai Lama, the emphasis must be placed on improving relations with Beijing.
In the 1980s, post-cultural revolution China was much more open to concession and agreement than present-day Beijing.
Tibet’s spiritual leader, though, were distrustful of what they saw as revolutionary China and deliberately avoided negotiation.
Today, Tibetan leaders may very well be kicking themselves. While the Dalai Lama is certainly a huge success on the world stage, his relations with Beijing have not yielded tangible progress.
At this point, his goal should be showing China that he is more than willing to make concessions and sit at the negotiating table.
The Dalai Lama is not getting any younger and if there is any hope for a Tibetan-Chinese peace, it may soon die with him.
