American foreign policy toward the Middle East is characterized by double standards and opportunism. Unfortunately, as Iraq nears sovereignty on June 30, 2004, little will have changed.
The hope for a secular Iraqi regime is at the mercy of political, domestic and international whim. Politically, those who launched the war want to see it wrapped up by June 30 in hopes that Americans will buy into a perception of victory. Domestically, there exists a latent desire across the United States to get American forces out of the Iraqi war-zone as soon as possible. Internationally, the United Nations and other countries want to see an end to an "illegal" American occupation.
These three whims are incompatible with the reality and future of Iraq. Even worse, by setting the deadline for Iraqi sovereignty to June 30, the United States and the international community breed false and unmanageable expectations for both the United States and Iraq.
Is June 30, 2004 a good date for a handover of power in Iraq?
For a Republican-controlled political establishment, it is -- not only will it potentially seal the deal in Iraq, but it undermines Democratic criticisms of the "mishandling of foreign policy." For an uneasy American public engaged in a "war on terror," the mythological emergence of democracy in Iraq is one step closer to a homecoming parade in New York. And, for the United Nations and other states, a June 30 handover of power is a necessary means toward combating American hegemony and influence in the region.
Some might suggest that June 30 is indeed a ripe time for the transfer of power in Iraq and is free from political considerations. This may well be the case -- but what if it is not? Is there a proper foundation in Iraq yet for constitutional democracy? Have the theo-political antagonisms worked themselves out? Probably not.
But by planning for an Iraqi handover on June 30, many of these prerequisites for an Arab democracy will likely be skipped over or swept under the rug. If the run up to the Iraq war proved anything, it is that proper planning for a democratic revolution is anything but, and all such planning must be approached with skepticism.
In the "80s, at the height of Reagan's Cold War policies, the United States supported Iraqi despotism as a bulwark against communism. In the early "90s, at the height of Bush's "new world order," the United States supported Iraqi disarmament as a means of securing the post-Cold War order. And currently, at the beginning of Bush's "war on terror," the United States implemented Iraqi regime-change as a means toward ensuring the safety of the West.
The logic at play today in pushing for Iraqi sovereignty is no different than these past 24 years. By maintaining a heavy-hand in the affairs of Iraq, the United States has succeeded in shaping the future of Iraq according to its political and domestic needs. This has twice proven itself to cause negative consequences; first when Iraq invaded Kuwait, and second when Iraq supposedly began to seek weapons of mass destruction. Twice, the United States has had to respond to the problems it created.
Will a premature democracy in Iraq continue this cycle of Iraqi mismanagement? Obviously, no one wants this. But political, domestic and international pressures are pushing for the potential premature democracy.
Perhaps the United States and others should sit back and tutor democracy rather than impose a deadline on it. German and Japanese history shows that when the United States tutors democracy it flourishes on its own; Iraq should be no different.
If the United States continues to believe and foment expectations of successful democratic revolution in Iraq by June 30, then it ought to expect the unintended consequences. Foresight such as this would have prevented much of American mis-action in Iraqi history.
Michael Huerta's column appears every two weeks.
